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Abstract

Cloud federations have been formed to share the services, prompt and support cooperation, as well as interoperability
among their already deployed cloud systems. However, the creation and management of the cloud federations lead to
various security issues such as confidentially, integrity and availability of the data. Despite the access control policies
in place, an attacker may compromise the communication channel processing the access requests and the decisions
between the access control systems and the members(users) and vice-versa. In cloud federation, the rating of the
services offered by different cloud members becomes integral to providing the users with the best quality services.
Hence, we propose an innovative blockchain- based framework that on the one hand permits secure communication
between the members of the federation and the access control systems, while on the other hand provides the quality
services to the members by considering the service constraints imposed by them.
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INTRODUCTION

Recent trends and advances such as cloud computing have made it possible to collect, store and
analyze data more pervasively, efficiently, and effectively [3]. But as more and more information
gets placed on the cloud, the concerns about how safe the cloud environment is, are beginning to
emerge [15], [16]. The users of the cloud computing don’t have the control over the data
placement, cost and the execution time associated with the services provided in the cloud
computing. Hence, quality of service issue (QoS) may arise during the cloud computing [13]
(Issue 1). Since users no longer physically own the storage of their data, traditional security
mechanisms cannot be applied to secure the data in cloud computing. Therefore, security and
privacy issues inhibit the enterprise customers from establishing their businesses in the cloud [4].
And recently, there is a trend of cloud federations, where members of federation share data and
services hosted on their platforms with the other members in the federation. Kurze et al.2011
defines cloud federation as: “Cloud federation comprises services from different providers
aggregated in a single pool supporting three basic interoperability features - resource
migration, resource redundancy and combination of complementary resources resp. services”.
But, many times resource sharing in cloud federation can be obstructed by access control
requirements set by the resource owner. To address this issue, there has been federation wide
access control systems deployed to enforce the access control policies set by the resource owner
[17]. This means that there will be distributed components that will receive, process access
requests and access decisions virtually. Hence, there is a possibility that exchanged access
request and access decision messages may be subverted, and user’s data may be accessed by
other unauthorized users. [4], [7] (Issue 2). Moreover, to encourage wide adoption of cloud
federations, federated clouds advocates the decentralized and democratic federation governance.
This means that amongst the federation members, there can’t be a designed leader responsible
for data governance, whereas federation members form the network of peers. An exemplar of
this trend is provided by federation as a Service FaaS cloud federation [14]. Hence, there is a
possibility that an attacker may violate database integrity by directly altering the database (Issue
3). A federation member may modify the database without informing other members leading to
integrity violation (Issue 4). Multiple members of cloud federation may also conspire together to
alter the database malevolently [8] (Issue 5).
To impede these collusion attacks, Blockchain technology can be seen as potential
candidate for designing and implementing a distributed, secure database for cloud federations.
Blockchain enables a trustless distributed peer to peer network where non-trusting members can
transact without a trusted intermediary. Not having a trusted intermediary means quicker
reconciliation between the transacting parties [5]. Blockchain has also received considerable
momentum for enthralling properties it guarantees (For instance: persistency and non-repudiation
of the data and distributed consensus) [8]. Blockchain is comprised of consecutive blocks which
are linked together in a decentralized peer to peer network. The original mining process still used
in Ethereum and bitcoin consist of blocks created in a decentralized fashion through the
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2018
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consensus algorithm called “Proof-of-Work”. Each block consists of the transactions, which the
nodes have agreed upon through the distributed consensus. Once the block becomes the part of
the block chain, it becomes non-repudiable and persistent, “unless an attacker has the majority of
miner’s hash power to create a fork of chain” [8]. In the context of cloud federations, the
blockchain could be used to establish the database with strong integrity guarantees. But, the
performance achieved with Proof of Work based blockchain is poor, as compared to the
technologies used in traditional databases. The lack of performance is due to the time-sensitive
task of the Proof of Work and broadcasting latency of the blocks on the network. All the
transactions stored on the blockchain have high confirmation latency, which leads to extremely
low throughput. [5], [8] (Issue 6). It is also difficult to maintain privacy on the blockchain. Each
participating node is recognized by their public keys. The participating nodes just needs to know
the keys of their transacting counterparties. Given that the blockchain transactions happen in
open, by analyzing this data, the attackers/ interested parties can recognize patterns and create
connections between addresses and make informed inferences about real identities behind them.
[5] (Issue 7).
Despite the intrinsic features of blockchain, the issues of poor performance and lack of
privacy make the blockchain incompatible with the cloud federations. Therefore, the objective of
this study is to deploy a blockchain-based cloud federation framework, with the improved
performance compared to PoW based blockchain “as-is”, while preserving the required
guarantees on data integrity, security, privacy as well as quality services. It should be noted that
several subsets of these challenges have been addressed in previous research, but no single
previous study has addressed all.
CONTRIBUTION
This study builds and extends the previous work by Gaetani et al. [8] in the scope of cloud
federations, which assures data integrity guarantees. The study by Gaetani et al. [7] doesn’t
address the other important issues such as secure commination between different components in
cloud federation, privacy as well as QoS constraints imposed by cloud federation members. In
this study, we extend the proposed framework by Gaetani at al. [8] for secure communication
between different components in cloud federation as well as address privacy and QoS related
issues of cloud federation members. To summarize, our first contribution is integrating all the
issues related to data integrity, secure access controls and QoS constraints specific to cloud
federation in one study. The second contribution is an innovative blockchain based framework
that ensures secure communication between the members of the federation and the access control
systems and privacy. The third contribution is that our proposed solution provides quality
services to the members by considering QoS constraints imposed by the members of the cloud
federation.
STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 presents the proposed framework and various
components in the framework. Description of the procedure for secure communication between
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2018/practice/3
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access control systems and federation members is depicted in Section 4. The proposed
framework is evaluated in Section 5. Section 6 reports discussion and concluding remarks.

2

OVERVIEW OF RELATED WORK

This section presents a review of related work and offers the comparative analysis of existing
blockchain related protocols related to cloud federation with the justification for the proposed
architecture. Ferdous et al. [7] presented the blockchain based decentralized runtime monitoring
architecture based on smart contracts to promote the accountability and transparency of access
control decisions in cloud federations. Suzic et al. [17] introduced a security governance
architecture, which permits the multi-layered, context and process-aware policy enforcement to
meet the data security and privacy requirements in a heterogeneous environment of cloud
federations.
Rahman et al. [13] argued that efficient scheduling is a significant issue for executing a
performance-driven application such as workflows in cloud computing environment, but the
existing techniques could not generate the schedules considering user QoS constraints and
workflow level optimization. Consequently, they proposed an Adaptive Hybrid Heuristic for data
analytics with the focus on satisfying the user constraints such as budget, deadline and data
placement, while optimizing and minimizing the cost of execution.
Lee and Lee [10] noted that embedded devices would be used frequently in the Internet
of Things context, but due to its limited capacities and resources, the substantial security
properties have not been applied to the embedded devices yet. Therefore, they proposed a secure
firmware update scheme that relies on blockchain technology.
Gaetani et al. [8] focused on the data integrity issues in the cloud federations. The authors
proposed the two-layer blockchain based model for the cloud federations. The first layer is the
permissioned blockchain, whereas the second layer is proof of work based blockchain. The
proposed architecture provides the desired guarantees on data integrity, performance and
stability, but doesn't focus on security issues.
Mizrahi et al. [11] proposed a protocol named Proof of Activity, a decentralized crypto
currency network that combines the Proof of Work and Proof of Stake, to offer good security
against possible attacks on Bitcoin. Proof of Work based protocol provides the decision-making
power to the entities performing computational tasks, whereas Proof of Stake gives decision
making power to entities holding stake in the system. Neither of these protocols are trouble free
and can mitigate all the major threats the cryptocurrency faces, when applied on their own.
Therefore, combining Proof of work and Proof of stake protocols can enhance the security
against possible cryptocurrency attacks.
Christidis and Devetsikiotis [5] notes that a Blockchain IoT combination automates
several existing, time consuming workflows in cryptographic verifiable manner. It also facilitates
sharing resources and services leading to creation of marketplace for devices so that the devices
can deploy various services at low cost. The study recommends using a new key for every
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2018
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transaction or having a separate key for counterparty transactions to make pattern discovery
difficult. The study also states that choosing the blockchain nodes wisely and having them sign
the contract can minimize the collusion.
The growing trend of cloud federation imposes several challenges. None of the studies in
the existing literature have adequately addressed all the challenges (stated in section 1) in a
single study. Based on existing literature, we propose an updated cloud federation framework
that caters to cloud federation needs related to security, integrity, and data quality in a single
study.

3

PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

In this section, we introduce a cloud federation framework with the focus on secure
communication channel processing the access requests and the access decisions between
different components in cloud federation. The proposed architecture extends and builds on the
blockchain-based cloud federation architecture proposed by Gaetani et al [8]. The proposed
architecture is a two-layer blockchain-based architecture. The first layer is based on mining
rotation consensus algorithm. The mining rotation consensus algorithm “divides the time into
rounds, and for each round elects a member as a leader. The leader is in charge of receiving new
operations, signing them with its private key and broadcasting them to other nodes in the
network.” Once all the minders sign the operations, they become part of the blockchain. At the
first layer blockchain, every operation carried out in the distributed database is stored quickly
and reliably. However, the first layer blockchain provides improved performance, but weak
integrity guarantees due to lack of PoW. The second layer is designed as PoW based blockchain
that stores the evidences of the database operations taking place at the first layer blockchain. The
first and second layer interacts through blockchain anchoring technique. Blockchain anchoring
technique is time- based operation that permits linking part of first layer blockchain with the
block of second layer blockchain. At specific time intervals, a witness transaction containing the
hash of first layer is sent to second layer block chain and these hashes are stored as the
immutable and irreversible transactions. The second layer provides data integrity guarantees, but
poor performance. But the principled interaction between first and second layer ensures data
integrity guarantees and high performance.
However, other issues such as secure communications between access control systems
and the federation members, privacy and QoS has not been addressed in the study. Therefore, in
this study, we add new layer named infrastructure tenant, which will address security, privacy
and QoS related issues along with data integrity guarantees and provide the cloud federations
with a comprehensive solution to all the issues stated in section 1. Figure 1 depicts various
components of the proposed cloud federation framework.
The framework comprises of three layers. The first layer is Infrastructure Tenant. The
second and third layer have been borrowed from Gaetani et al [8]. The first and second layer is
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based on mining rotation consensus mechanism, a permissioned blockchain. The third layer is
PoW based blockchain and operates only in the background. All three layers interacts through
blockchain anchoring technique similar to Gaetani et al [8].

3.1

LAYER 1: INFRASTRUCTURE TENANT

This layer is owned by all the members of the federation and is maintained virtually. The cloud
federation has a single infrastructure tenant, which enables central functionalities underlying the
federation. Infrastructure tenant is the virtual space formed by resources belonging to different
clouds [14]. This layer is comprised of components described below:
3.1.1

ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM

The access control system allows the cloud members to access services in a secure and
controlled manner. It is based on the eXtensible Access Control Markup language (XACML) and
is comprised of the Policy Decision Point (PDP), the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), the
Policy Retrieval Point (PRP), and the Policy Administration Point (PAP), and Policy
Information Point (PIP). PDP evaluates access decision based on the available policies. Upon
receiving the user’s request, PEP forwards the request to PDP, which calculates the access
decision. The evaluation process carried by PDP depends, on the one hand, on access control
policies made available by PRP and administered by PAP. On the other hand, it is based on
contextual information provided by PIP [1].
3.1.2 WORK FLOW ENGINE
The Work Flow Engine creates, deploys and monitors the execution of the workflows in a cloud
federation. Work Flow Engine has three sub-components. The Workflow engine component has
been adapted from the architecture proposed by Rahman et al [13]. However, the activities of the
subcomponents of the workflow engine have been modified in this study to fit the cloud
federation operations. The Monitor monitors whether all the services are adequately executed or
not. The monitor also depends on the event engine to gather the access logs and analyzes the
gathered access logs to see if for the given request or the access is the expected one. Scheduler
maps the tasks to the services based on the sophisticated scheduling algorithm while satisfying
the user's constraints on cost and execution time. It prepares the service file based on the
constraints imposed by the user and the availability of the service. The Dispatcher deploys the
task to the corresponding service via the Service Adaptor. It also communicates with the miner
requesting the service via Event engine.
3.1.3 SERVICE ADAPTOR
Service adaptor integrates federation services to the end user point and serves as the primary
point of contact (by the dispatcher) for requesting the access code for members.

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2018
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3.1.4 SERVICE RATINGS
Different cloud members may offer similar services, but at a different cost. All the services and
the cost associated with them are reconciled together to find the optimal one, i.e., the best quality
service at low price. The design of the rating service is out of the scope of this study.
3.1.5 EVENT ENGINE
Event Engine is responsible for intercepting and forwarding the data and the messages to create
access logs. It also stores and keeps track of all the processes and events which occur due to the
generation of all the messages from the user end and the infrastructure components.

3.2

LAYER 2: MINING ROTATION BASED BLOCKCHAIN

The mining rotation consensus algorithm “divides the time into rounds, and for each round elects
a member as a leader. The leader is in charge of receiving new operations, signing them with its
private key and broadcasting them to other nodes in the network.” Once all the minders sign the
operations, they become part of the blockchain.
3.2.1

LEDGER REPLICAS

Ledger replicas are the replicas of the distributed ledger held and updated independently by each
member of the cloud federation. Miner in this framework refers to cloud federation member.

3.3

LAYER 3: PROOF OF WORK (PoW) BASED BLOCKCHAIN

It is the blockchain based on "Proof of Work." Proof of Work (PoW) is an obtuse mathematical
puzzle used to validate the transactions and build new blocks to the chain. It is used by miners to
compete against each other and get rewarded.
3.3.1 BLOCKCHAIN ANCHORING TECHNIQUE
It is time-based operation that permits linking the part of the first layer blockchain with the
block of the second layer blockchain.

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2018/practice/3

6

sandhu and Osei-Bryson: A Blockchain-based Security-Oriented Framework for Cloud Federati

Figure 1. Proposed Framework (Source: Layer 2 and Layer3: [8], p.152)
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4

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEDURE

The procedure (step 1-step 12) below provides the step by step description of communication
between access control systems and the members of the cloud federation for processing access
requests and access decisions. Notations used in the study are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Notations used in the study
NOTATION DEFINITION
𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘 Request Verification Check Message: This is the message sent by the request node
(member) to the dispatcher (response node) to verify its identity and receive the
service file. The request verification message includes the public key of the
miner(member), identifier, Service Identifier, task identifier, service constraints,
random number, and timestamp.
𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘 Response Verification Check Message: This is the message sent by the response
node (Dispatcher) to the request node (miner) after verifying the identity of the
Member (i.e., miner) The message includes the public key of the miner, service
file, and the metadata of the service file.
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑚
Service Identifier: This is the unique identification number of the service which a
miner wants to access. For instance: resource services, analytics services, etc.
Service Constraint: This is the constraint imposed by the user on the execution of
𝑆𝐶
the service. It includes 𝑆𝑏 (Service budget), 𝑆𝑑 (Service Deadline) and 𝐷𝑃𝑐 (Data
Placement Constraint).
𝐼𝐷𝑚
Identifier: This is the identification number provided to each member. The
member can’t operate without the service identification number.
𝑆𝑟
Service File: The file is prepared by the scheduler based on the constraints
imposed by the user and the availability of the service by the service provider. The
file contains the documents related to the data placement as well as the service
provider.
𝑇𝐼𝐷
Task Identifier: This is the identifier for a specific task such as computing,
storage, processing in particular service.
𝑀𝑟
Metadata File of 𝑆𝑟 : The metadata file is composed of the file name, the hash
value of the file, tracker URL, and length of the file [8].
𝑃𝑈𝑚
Public Key of the Miner (member): The public key generated at the time of the
request verification message. Every time a miner sends a request verification
message, it is required to create a new public key. This is done to ensure the
maintain the privacy on the blockchain.
𝑃𝑅𝑚
Private Key of Miner (member). It is the corresponding private key to the public
key generated at the time of the request verification message.
𝑃𝑈𝑑
Public Key of the Dispatcher: Each time a dispatcher receives the request
verification check message, it automatically creates the new pair of cryptographic
keys: the public key and the corresponding private key.
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2018/practice/3
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𝑃𝑅𝑑
𝑃𝑈𝑠
𝐼𝐷𝑑
𝐼𝐷𝑠
𝑟
H(𝑓𝑆𝑟 )
𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑚

𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑑
𝑟𝑒𝑞__𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠

𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑆𝑅𝐶
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑆𝑅𝐶
𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐
𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠

Private Key of the Dispatcher: It is the corresponding private key to the public key
generated at the time of the request verification message.
Public Key of the Service Adaptor that is available to all nodes in the blockchain
network.
Identifier of the dispatcher: It is the identification number provided to dispatcher.
Identifier of the Scheduler: It is the unique identification number provided to the
scheduler
Random number
Verifier: The hash value of the service file is generated according to the metadata
of the service file. This value is used to ensure that the file has not been altered or
corrupted [8].
Digital Signature of Member (miner):
The digital signature of miner is an encryption that uses the private key of the
miner. Pubic key of the miner is added to the signature. Doing so will let anyone
decrypt and verify the signature using the miner’s public key [2].
Digital Signature of the Dispatcher.
Request Service Access Message: This message is sent by the miner (member) to
request the service access code for a specific task within the specific service. It
includes the verifier and the random number and is encrypted with the public key
of the Dispatcher.
Request Service Access Code Message: This message is sent by the Dispatcher to
request the latest Service Access Code from the Service Adapter.
Response Service Access Code Message: The Service Adaptor sends this message
to the Dispatcher. It is encrypted with the Dispatcher’s public key and includes
the latest Service Access Code, random number.
Latest Service Access Code: The latest Service Access Code generated by the
Service Adaptor based on the Verifier and the decision of the PDP. The Service
Access Code is only valid for a particular period.
Response Service Access Message: The encrypted message generated by the
Dispatcher to send the Service Access Code to the miner.

Step 1: Miner (request node) sends 𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘 i.e. Request Verification Check to the
Dispatcher including its 𝑃𝑈𝑚 , 𝐼𝐷𝑚 , 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑚 , 𝑆𝐶 , and r. Note: to prevent the replay attack, a
random number r is generated. All the operations are logged in through the Event Engine which
creates an initial access log.
𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘(𝑃𝑈𝑚 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑚 ∥ 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑚 ∥ 𝑇𝐼𝐷 ∥ 𝑆𝐶 ∥ 𝑟)
(1)
Step 2: When the Dispatcher receives the 𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘 message, it first communicates with the
Scheduler through its unique identification number i.e. 𝐼𝐷𝑑 and obtains the
𝑆𝑟 (i. e. , the 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑒) and the corresponding 𝑀𝑟 , (i.e., metadata of the Service File) from
the Scheduler based on the 𝑃𝑈𝑚 , 𝐼𝐷𝑚 , 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑚 , 𝑇𝐼𝐷 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝐶 .
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2018
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Note: The communications within the infrastructural tenant cannot be compromised, because the
intra -tenant communications rely on secured VPN tunnels [7].
Step 3: Now, the Dispatcher responds to the miner by sending encrypted (encrypted with the
public key of the miner) Response Verification Check (𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘) message including 𝑆𝑟 , the
corresponding 𝑀𝑟 , r+1, his/her public key i.e., 𝑃𝑈𝐷 and his/her identifier i.e. 𝐼𝐷𝑑 .
𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘(𝐸(𝑃𝑈𝑚 , 𝑆𝑟 , 𝑀𝑟 ∥ 𝑟 + 1 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑑 ∥ 𝑃𝑈𝐷 ))
(2)
Step 4: When miner receives the 𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘 message, it decrypts the message with its private
key (i.e., 𝑃𝑅𝑚 ) and checks r+1. The miner then generates the Verifier H(𝑓𝑆𝑟 ) from 𝑀𝑟 .
Step 5: Then the miner encrypts the 𝐼𝐷𝑚 , H(𝑓𝑆𝑟 ) and r+2 with the 𝑃𝑈𝑑 and generates the digital
signature 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑚 using his/her private key (i.e. 𝑃𝑅𝑚 ) over a 𝑟𝑒𝑞__𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 message containing
the encrypted data i.e. 𝐼𝐷𝑚 , H(𝑓𝑆𝑟 ) and r+2
𝑟𝑒𝑞__𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝐸(𝑃𝑈𝑑 , 𝐼𝐷𝑚 , 𝐻(𝑓𝑆𝑟 ) ∥ 𝑟 + 2) ∥ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑚 )
(3)
Step6: When the Dispatcher receives the 𝑟𝑒𝑞__𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 message, it first verifies the message’s
integrity, and originator with the digital signature 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑚 attached to it by decrypting the
message with the public key 𝑃𝑈𝑚 obtained from 𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘 (recall Step 1). Since 𝐼𝐷𝑚 ,
H(𝑓𝑆𝑟 ) and 𝑟 + 2 has also been encrypted with the private key of the dispatcher, the dispatcher
decrypts the encrypted data with his/her 𝑃𝑅𝑑 and checks 𝑟 + 2
Step 7: Now, the Dispatcher communicates with the service adaptor through its unique
identification number and sends the Request Service Code message (i.e., 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑆𝑅𝐶 ) to the Service
Adaptor by encrypting the 𝐻(𝑓𝑆𝑟 ), r+3 with 𝑃𝑈𝑆 (i.e., the public key of the service adaptor).
𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑆𝑅𝐶 (𝐸( 𝑃𝑈𝑆 , 𝐻(𝑓𝑆𝑟 ) ∥ 𝑟 + 3))
(4)
Note: The miners can’t access the service code directly from the Service adaptor since the
Dispatcher has to verify the identity of the miner and the Verifier generated for the service file
before sending the request for the service access code to the Service adaptor.
Step 8: The Service Adaptor decrypts the message with its private key and communicates with
the access control system through its unique identification number i.e. 𝐼𝐷𝑠 Note: The legitimacy
of the access control system is assumed because no updates(operations) are complete until all the
members sign the operation. The service adaptor prepares the 𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐 (the service access code)
based on the PDP decision and the verifier 𝐻(𝑓𝑆𝑟 ).
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Step 9: The Service Adaptor communicates with the dispatcher through 𝐼𝐷𝑠 and sends the
Response Service Code Access message (i.e., 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑆𝑅𝐶 ) including the 𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐 (i.e., the current service
access code) and r+4 that has been encrypted with the public key 𝑃𝑈𝑑 of the dispatcher.
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑆𝑅𝐶 (𝐸( 𝑃𝑈𝑑 , 𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐 ∥ 𝑟 + 4 ))
(5)
Step 10: The Dispatcher upon receiving the message checks the r+4 and decrypts the Response
Service Code Access message 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑆𝑅𝐶 with 𝑃𝑅𝑑 .
Step 11: Later, the Dispatcher sends the Response Service access message (i.e., 𝑟𝑒𝑠__𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) to
the miner. The message includes 𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐 , and r+5 which has been encrypted with 𝑃𝑈𝑚 (i.e., the
public key of the miner). The dispatcher attaches the digital signature (𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑑 ) to the
Response Service access message. The dispatcher uses his/her Private key (i.e., 𝑃𝑅𝑑 ) to generate
the digital signature.
𝑟𝑒𝑠__𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 (𝐸( 𝑃𝑈𝑚 , 𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐 ∥ 𝑟 + 5) ∥ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑑 ))
(6)
Step 12: The miner upon receiving the Response Service Success message verifies the message’s
integrity and originator by decrypting the message with the public key of dispatcher previously
shared (recall step 3). Later, the miner decrypts the 𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐 with his/her public key 𝑃𝑚 and checks
(r+5). Now, the miner can access the service from the service adapter by using the 𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐
Note: Each time a miner requests a new service access, he/she has to generate new
public/private keys and so as the dispatcher and scheduler for responding to new service request.

5
A CLOUD FEDERATION ILLUSTRATION USING THE
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Peffers et al. [12] reports that several studies that involve the evaluation of framework have used
illustrative scenario. Similar to those studies we are also going to use the illustrative scenario for
the evaluation of our artifact. This scenario is based on the SUNFISH FaaS case study, in which
the concept of Federation-as- a-service (FaaS) was introduced. The Sunfish FaaS is an innovative
cloud federation platform that permits the public and private clouds to federate themselves to
share the services, resources, and data [13]. In this paper, FaaS functionalities take place at the
first layer, service request and service provider functionalities take place at the second and data
governance takes place at all the three layers. At the second layer, miner 1, miner 2 and miner 3
represent each cloud member respectively. For the sake of convenience, we will only illustrate
the service request functionality and data governance of FaaS.
We assume that service 1, 2 and 3 represents resource services, analytics services, and
software deployment services in the proposed framework. Each service has various tasks
associated with it. Miner 1 wants to utilize the storage service for its clients as it doesn’t possess
the storage resources. Miner 2 and Miner 3 are service providers of the storage services. Once
Miner 2 and 3 register their services in cloud federation, the service publication publishes the
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services and makes the service list available for Miner 1, 2 and 3. Each service has a unique
service identifier. Miner 2 and Miner 3 both provide the storage resources, but at different cost
and speed. The service ratings functionality rates the services provided by Miner 2 and Miner 3
based on the service speed and corresponding cost for executing the task in a service. We also
assume that the service list and the corresponding tasks list including the Service identifier and
Task identifier is made available to each member while registering for the cloud federation.
Step 1: Miner 1 broadcasts the request verification check message along with its identifier,
Service identifier, task identifier, Service constraints, his/her public key, and the random number
to the blockchain network. When the request verification check message is sent, time stamp is
generated automatically. The service constraints imposed by Miner 1 includes data placement
constraint and budgetary constraint for executing the whole service.
Step 2: When Dispatcher receives the request verification check message, it verifies identity of
miner based on identifier of miner stored in its database. If miner’s identifier equals identifier of
miner stored in the database of Dispatcher, Dispatcher will communicate with the Scheduler to
obtain the Service file and corresponding Metadata file, otherwise, the process is terminated with
an error.
Note: Scheduler prepares the Service file based on the service constraints imposed by the
Miner1. The Dispatcher obtains the Service file and the Metadata file from the Scheduler.
Step 3: Dispatcher sends the Response verification check message including the encrypted
(encrypted with the public key of Miner 1) new Service file generated by Scheduler, Metadata of
the Service file, r+1, his/her identifier i.e., identifier of the dispatcher, his/her newly generated
public key i.e., dispatcher’s public key. The Response verification check message can only be
decrypted with the corresponding private key to the public key of Miner1.
Step 4: Miner 1 upon receiving Response Verification Check decrypts the Response Verification
Check message with his/her private key i.e. private key of miner 1 and checks the r+1. The
Miner 1 prepares the hash value of the Service file, i.e., the verifier from the Metadata file of the
Service file [10].
Step5: Miner 1 encrypts the verifier of service file and r+2 with the Public key of Dispatcher.
Now Miner 1 generates the digital signature using his/her (Miner) private key (i.e., The
corresponding private key to the public key shared in step1) and attaches digital signature over
the Request Service Access message containing encrypted identifier of the miner, verifier of the
service file and r+2.
Step6: When Dispatcher receives the Request service access message, it decrypts digitally signed
message using the public key of the Miner 1 obtained from the Request verification message in
step1 to verify integrity and originator of the message. The successful decryption accounts a
digital signature verification meaning that there is no doubt that the message was sent by the
miner 1. Now the Dispatcher decrypts the identifier, verifier of service file and r+2 with his/her
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private key i.e., private key of the dispatcher. The verifier helps dispatcher to verify the integrity
of the Service file.
Step 7: Now, the Dispatcher communicates with service adaptor using its (i.e., dispatcher’s)
unique identification number and sends the Request access code message by encrypting the
verifier of service file and r+3 with the public key of the Service adaptor to request the Service
code for Miner 1.
Step 8: The Service Adaptor upon receiving the Request access code message decrypts the
message with his/her Private key i.e., Private key of the service adaptor. The Service Adaptor
communicates with the PDP via its unique identification number and prepares the Service access
code based on PDP decision and Verifier of the service file. The Service access code will be the
current Service Access Code.
Step9: Now, Service Adaptor encrypts the Service access code with the Public key of Dispatcher
and sends the Response service access code message to dispatcher including the Service access
code and r+4.
Step 10: Dispatcher receives the Response service access code message. The Dispatcher
decrypts the Response service access code message using his/her Private key and checks r+4.
Step 11: Dispatcher encrypts the Service access code and r+5 with the Public key of Miner 1.
Dispatcher also prepares the Digital signature using his/her (dispatcher) Private key. Later, the
digital signature of Dispatcher is attached to the Response service access message. The
Dispatcher sends the Response service access message including encrypted service access code
and r+5 to Miner 1.
Step 12: Miner 1 decrypts the message with previously shared Public key of Dispatcher (recall
step3) to verify the integrity and originator of the message. Later, Miner 1 decrypts the Response
service access message using his/her Private key. Now, Miner 1 can access the storage resources
of the miner 2 based on the Service access code.

6

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This section discusses how the solution we proposed successfully addresses issues outlined in
section 1. The Scheduler prepares the service file based on QoS constraints imposed by miner.
The Scheduler interacts with the service ratings to get the information on service quality and cost
associated with service provided by each member. The Scheduler maps the service constraints to
the information provided by the service ratings to choose the best available service for the
members and hence addresses (Issue 1).
In Section 4, Step 1 - Step12 exhibits secure communication between members and access
control systems. Inclusion of various components such as identifier of the nodes, public key,
verifier, digital signature, service access code, encryption, and random number provides
enhanced privacy and authentication and hence address the security issue (Issue 2). The
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components are required to use new cryptographic key each time a new service access is made,
making the pattern identification difficult for the interested parties/attackers and enhance the
privacy. (Issue 7)
Also, all the events (from step 1 and step 12) are recorded in Event Engine. The Monitor
collects logs from the event engine to see if, for the given request, access is the expected one.
Since, all miners use their private keys to sign the operations, the attacker will need to steal all
the private keys of the participating members to alter databases (Issue 3). In the setting of cloud
federation, it would mean attacking multiple distributed cloud members simultaneously.
The consensus algorithm attributed at the first and second layer considers all the
members in the federation. Therefore, no database operation can be completed without all the
members being aware of it. (Issue 4) [8]
If multiple members collude together to attack a single miner, then the honest miner can
react by not sending its message within consensus protocol and prevent the malicious database
operation from being completed. (Issue 5). If collation attack was targeted to modify the
information already stored in first and second layer i.e., the information is already agreed on by
all the federation members, then the honest miner can show the original version by presenting the
messages previously signed and sent by other members (i.e., an information is only stored, when
the consensus on the message is received) [8].
To resolve the performance issues (Issue 6) first and second layer is based on mining
rotation algorithm and leverages PoW only in the background. The operation on the database is
completed as soon as it is elaborated by first and second layer blockchain. At first- and secondlayer block chain, every operation carried out in the distributed database is stored quickly and
reliably. However, first and second layer block chain provides improved performance, but weak
integrity guarantees due to lack of PoW. The third layer is designed as PoW based block chain
that stores the evidences of database operations in first and second-layer block chain. These
evidences are stored as the immutable and irreversible transactions, but with the poor
performance [8]. Overall, the principled interaction between three layers permits achieving
effective assurances on data integrity, security, privacy and enhanced performance. This study
identifies the requirements of the cloud federation by studying the prior literature. None of the
studies (as per our knowledge) have explicitly integrated all the challenges related to cloud
federation within a unifying framework. Our first contribution is combining all the issues
associated with cloud computing specifically with reference to cloud federation in one study. The
second contribution is an innovative blockchain based framework that permits secure
communication between the members of the federation and the access control systems and
ensures privacy. The third contribution is that the proposed solution solves the QoS issue by
considering service constraints imposed by members, while providing the services. We also
evaluated the proposed framework through the illustrative scenario. One limitation to this study
is that availability issue can emerge, if a single miner refuses to sign the operations. The study
can be extended in different directions. First, the further research may be conducted by deploying
the proposed framework in some simulated setting. Second, future research may focus on
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integrating availability with data integrity as well as secure access controls to overcome the
limitations of our framework.
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